The Evolution of the Municipal Corporation and the Innovations of Local Governance in California to Preserve Home Rule and Local Control by Zerunyan, Frank Vram
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 44
Number 1 Symposium - Home Rule in an Era of
Municipal Innovation
Article 7
2017
The Evolution of the Municipal Corporation and
the Innovations of Local Governance in California
to Preserve Home Rule and Local Control
Frank Vram Zerunyan
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frank Vram Zerunyan, The Evolution of the Municipal Corporation and the Innovations of Local Governance in California to Preserve Home
Rule and Local Control, 44 Fordham Urb. L.J. 217 (2017).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol44/iss1/7
  217
THE EVOLUTION OF THE MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION AND THE INNOVATIONS OF 
LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN CALIFORNIA TO 
PRESERVE HOME RULE AND LOCAL CONTROL 
Frank Vram Zerunyan, J.D.* 
Introduction ...................................................................................... 217 
I.  History of the Municipal Corporation .......................................... 220 
II.  California’s Charter Law City and the Significance of Sovereignty 
in Municipal Affairs ................................................................... 224 
III.  California’s General Law Cities and State Law ........................ 228 
IV.  Independent, Full Service, and Contract Cities ......................... 230 
V.  The Lakewood Plan for a Successful Contract City  .................. 232 
VI.  City Management Structure ....................................................... 238 
VII.  Uniform Laws Guiding Municipalities .................................... 240 
VIII.  Tax Matters and Infrastructure................................................ 242 
Conclusion ........................................................................................ 244 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Constitution is the fundamental law of the United States of 
America.  Drafted at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, in 1787, it is the world’s oldest and still valid written 
constitution.1  While it is common knowledge that the words “local 
government” and “home rule” do not appear in the text of the Constitution, 
it is incorrect to conclude that the drafters of the Constitution did not value 
decentralization or local governance.  To this day, real American daily life 
at the local level is alive and well.  After all, we live, work and die in cities 
or towns across these United States.  Cities are the most networked and 
interconnected of our political organizations.  They govern through 
                                                                                                                 
* Professor of the Practice of Governance at the University of Southern California Sol Price 
School of Public Policy and three-term Mayor and Council Member in the City of Rolling 
Hills Estates, California. 
 1. See Johnny H. Killian, Constitution of the United States, U.S. S. (1994), 
http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm [https://perma.cc/74UL-
TLWK]. 
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collaboration and pragmatism to solve real public-administration problems 
at the local level.2  This article reviews the evolution of municipal 
corporations and the innovations that make them special in the art and 
science of local governance. 
The concept of decentralized governance finds its roots in the Articles of 
Confederation, which, of course, predates the U.S. Constitution and the Bill 
of Rights.3  Article II of the Articles of Confederation declares that “each 
state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, 
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated 
to the United States, in Congress assembled.”4  Similarly, the Tenth 
Amendment of the Constitution states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are 
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”5  Because the Tenth 
Amendment was a natural progression of that for which the Federalists had 
argued and advocated during the adoption of the Constitution,6 James 
Madison faced no opposition in proposing it.  Reading this Amendment in 
the context of the Age of Enlightenment provides the strongest evidence that 
the drafters very much intended to bring government closest to the people 
and away from a central form of authority.  French, English, and American 
political philosophers, such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, John Locke, and 
Thomas Paine, authored many writings during this period against 
authoritarian government and for representative government.7  In fact, these 
concerns about centralized versus decentralized powers came about mainly 
because of colonial America’s experience in which most people interacted 
with their local officials.8  This special experience was observed by Alexis 
De Tocqueville, who coined the term “American Exceptionalism.”9  In 2017, 
not much has changed.  The level of government that interacts the most with 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, IF MAYORS RULED THE WORLD 4 (2013). 
 3. See Founding Documents and Resources, B. OF RTS. INST., 
https://www.billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents [https://perma.cc/36MY-D88S]. 
See generally MILESTONES: 1776–1783: Articles of Confederation, 1777–1781, OFFICE OF 
THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1776-1783/articles 
[https://perma.cc/7THX-4Z8Z]. 
 4. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II. 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 6. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (“The powers delegated by the 
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.  Those which are to 
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”). 
 7. See THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776). See generally Eiichi Shimomissé, The 
Philosophies of Enlightenment, CTR. FOR PHILOSOPHY & PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDIES 
(1997), http://www.csudh.edu/phenom_studies/western/lect_8.html [https://perma.cc/DNQ7-
TL2W]. 
 8. See generally EARNEST S. GRIFFITH, HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT:  THE 
COLONIAL PERIOD (1972). 
 9. See 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 36 (1840). 
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citizens through municipal departments, public schools, and various special 
districts is still exceptional and is very much local.10 
The drafters of the Constitution understood that a broader national 
authority would destroy local interests.  They worked to create a functional 
republican structure strong enough to enforce national interests but limited 
enough to assure individual self-determination where citizens lived and 
worked.11  Madison summarized this concept as “the necessity of providing 
more effectually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation 
of Justice.”12  At the Constitutional Convention, Madison unsuccessfully 
argued that the U.S. Congress should have power to veto state laws.  
Alexander Hamilton, on the other hand, concerned with the mighty power of 
the national government, wrote that state legislatures in such instances 
should “sound the alarm to the people” and serve as the “jealous guardians 
of the rights of citizens.”13  The controversy about the appropriate division 
of power between the federal government and the states still rages today, but 
there is no question that the drafters of the Constitution agreed on the wisdom 
of dividing power both among branches of government and within those 
branches of government.14  That division is reflected today in the 
constitutions of all fifty states, where local governments find their voice in 
home rule, or what has generically become the concept of local control, one 
state constitution at a time.15  Simply stated, home rule refers to the power 
of a local municipality to set up its own system or charter of self-government 
as opposed to receiving that charter from the state.16 
This eight-part Article discusses the historical evolution of the municipal 
corporation, the nuances of self-governance, California law on municipal 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See Speak Out, ANNENBERG CLASSROOM, http://www.annenbergclassroom.org/
speakout/how-does-local-government-affect-you [https://perma.cc/EE4L-C5LA]. 
 11. The U.S. Constitution grants very limited powers to the federal government.  Instead, 
the Tenth Amendment reserves authority-giving powers to states.  To describe local 
governments today is to speak of fifty different legal and political organizations. 
 12. See Madison Debates–June 6, THE AVALON PROJECT (June 6, 1787), http://avalon.
law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_606.asp [https://perma.cc/4B2J-X9CE]. 
 13. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 14. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. et al. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2573 (2012) (“The 
Framers knew the difference between doing something and doing nothing. They gave 
Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it. Ignoring that distinction would 
undermine the principle that the Federal Government is a government of limited and 
enumerated powers.”). 
 15. See Local Government Authority, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, http://www.nlc.org/build-
skills-and-networks/resources/cities-101/city-powers/local-government-authority 
[https://perma.cc/52JW-ELXT]. 
 16. Home Rule Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL, http://definitions.uslegal.com/h/
home-rule/ [https://perma.cc/44FE-ENZC]. 
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affairs, and California-centric innovations in governance.17  Part I describes 
the historical context for local governance, which has led to home rule not 
only in California but also across the nation.  In Part II, the Article dives right 
into the discussion of home rule in the context of the legal entity known in 
California as charter law cities.  Part III distinguishes charter law cities from 
the overwhelming majority of city structures in California, known as general 
law cities, which also enjoy home rule through what is commonly referred 
to as police power.  In Part IV, the Article defines and draws distinctions 
between governance models known in California as independent or contract 
cities.  Part V focuses on the innovation in governance known in California 
as the Lakewood Plan, which facilitates the governance model of contract 
cities.  Parts VI and VII provide a general discussion of guiding principles in 
management and uniform laws applicable to municipalities, and the Article 
winds down in Part VIII by examining tax matters and infrastructure finance 
tools unique to California. 
I.  HISTORY OF THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 
Until about the mid to late nineteenth century, the powers given to local 
governments through state constitutions remained untested.  The general 
interpretation of a local government’s authority in early 1800s was 
unchallenged in the courts and was, therefore, under a state government’s 
discretion.  State’s interpretations became the subject matter of litigation in 
the late 1800s.  Two separate rulings, one from Iowa and the other from 
Michigan, framed two diametrically opposed viewpoints.  In 1868, Judge 
John F. Dillon of Iowa affirmed a narrow interpretation of a local 
government’s authority,18 holding that municipalities maintain a subordinate 
status within the state because, as a rule, they get their specific powers from 
the state.  Therefore, in the absence of specific provisions increasing their 
power, municipalities are subject to state legislative control.  This view 
became known as Dillon’s Rule.  In contrast, in 1871, Judge Thomas Cooley 
of the Michigan Supreme Court challenged Dillon’s Rule,19 holding that 
municipalities possess inherent rights to local self-governance.  Taking a 
more populist view, Judge Cooley reasoned that “local governments . . . are 
either simultaneous with, or precede, the more central authority” and that, if 
Dillon’s Rule were publicly asserted, it “would be somewhat startling to our 
people.”20  However, the Cooley view of local government power as an 
absolute right never gained much acceptance and was, in fact, discredited by 
                                                                                                                 
 17. The selection of California law is purely the personal choice of the author, a California 
lawyer and a California public servant. 
 18. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. R.R., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868). 
 19. People ex rel. Leroy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 109 (1871). 
 20. See id. at 100. 
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the United States Supreme Court.  In 1903 and again in 1923, the Court 
upheld Dillon’s Rule.21  In the years following those decisions, with few 
exceptions, state law restricted municipal powers to those “explicitly 
granted,” “necessarily or fairly implied,” or “essential” to accomplish the 
purposes of the municipality.22 
The evolution of Dillon’s Rule restricted home rule, requiring states to 
explicitly grant power to cities through state constitutions or subsequent 
legislation.  In practice, today Dillon’s Rule is fully implemented in the 
overwhelming majority of states, which create through their constitutions the 
power for local self-governance by a local charter.23  State provisions for 
home rule are specifically defined by each state’s constitution or, in states 
like California, by additional statutes enacted by that state’s legislature.  In 
California, home rule applies to what California labels as charter law cities.24 
All states grant cities and counties the ability to administer their 
municipalities at the local level through either the state constitution or 
government code.  These provisions set forth the powers of cities and 
counties to organize under the laws of the state as a municipal corporation.  
For example, California provides for two types of municipal corporations: 
charter cities and general law cities.25  The California Constitution prescribes 
a uniform procedure for the formation of charter cities, while statutes in the 
California Government Code provide the procedure for the formation of 
general law cities.26  The basic difference between general law and charter 
law cities is the degree of control that the state government may exercise 
over them.  Because charter cities are granted the authority of home rule and 
the right to craft their own charters, they enjoy more freedom than general 
law cities to innovate and to pass ordinances according to local need. 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Dillon’s Rule is within the mainstream of American judicial and academic sentiment. 
See, e.g., 2 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4:3 (3d ed.); 
Gerald E. Drug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1082 (1980). 
 22. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 221 (1903); Attorney Gen. ex rel. Lennane v. City of 
Detroit, 196 N.W. 391, 392 (Mich. 1923).  These cases uphold Dillon’s Rule and its purpose 
to restrict municipal powers to those explicitly granted. 
 23. NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 15. 
 24. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(a) (West 2016) (“For its own government, a county or city 
may adopt a charter by majority vote of its electors voting on the question.  The charter is 
effective when filed with the Secretary of State.  A charter may be amended, revised, or 
repealed in the same manner.  A charter, amendment, revision, or repeal thereof shall be 
published in the official state statutes.  County charters adopted pursuant to this section shall 
supersede any existing charter and all laws inconsistent therewith.  The provisions of a charter 
are the law of the State and have the force and effect of legislative enactments.”).  
 25. See generally CAL. CONST. art. XI (West 2016). 
 26. General law cities operate under California Government Code Title 4 (commencing 
with § 34000) and other applicable California laws. See generally CAL. GOV’T CODE § 23000 
et seq. (West 1947); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 34000 et seq. (West 1949). 
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Nevertheless, in practice general law cities also have considerable choice 
in the management of their local affairs.  Article XI, Section 7 of the current 
California Constitution provides a general grant of inherent local powers to 
every city without regard to its status as a charter or general law city.27  Some 
refer to this as the police power or even home rule.28  In fact, absent a clear 
indication of preemptive intent from the California Legislature, cities are 
granted clear powers to regulate land use and other matters linked to this 
police power.29  Because the state Constitution and Legislature have tended 
to give general law cities similar management control over local matters as 
they have to charter cities, the original distinction between the two forms of 
city authority has been somewhat blurred in California. 
In light of the advancement of general law in Government Code sections, 
developing jurisprudence, and legislative power granted to municipalities to 
manage local affairs, most cities, in practice, are general law cities.  They opt 
out of home rule under a charter to save on the administrative cost of 
establishing and maintaining the charter.  This ratio is supported by the data 
in California, where 121 cities out of 482 total California cities operate under 
chartered home rule.30  With a handful of exceptions, charter law cities in 
California were either incorporated before 1960 or are larger cities with 
average population sizes over 100,000 residents.  However, a 
disproportionate amount of Californians live in charter cities, including Los 
Angeles, San Diego, San Jose, Santa Clara, Sacramento, and San 
Francisco.31 
The first California Constitution was adopted in November of 1849 in 
advance of California attaining statehood in the United States.32  The first 
incorporated charter city in California was the city of San Francisco, 
incorporated February 18, 1850, followed by Sacramento on February 27, 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See generally CAL. CONST. art. XI § 7 (West 2016). 
 28. See generally CAL. CONST. art. XI (West 2016); Kourtney Burdick et al., The Origins 
of California City Powers, WESTERN CITY, Jan. 2008, http://www.westerncity.com/Western-
City/January-2008/The-Origins-of-California-City-Powers/ [https://perma.cc/5JGL-T2F4]. 
 29. City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Ctr., Inc., 56 Cal. 4th 
729, 742-43 (2013).  It is worthy of note that this case involves the regulatory legislation of a 
charter city, since charter cities as well as general law cities exercise home rule under the 
inherent police power granted to all cities by Article XI, § 7.  In other words, the City of 
Riverside did not rely on its status as a charter city under Article XI, § 5, but, rather, on its 
home rule authority under Article XI, § 7. 
 30. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(a) (West 2016); Charter Cities List, LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, 
http://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Resources-Section/Charter-
Cities/Charter_Cities-List [https://perma.cc/C32C-ZRW8] (Nov. 13, 2016). 
 31. LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, supra note 30. 
 32. Constitutions, CAL. SEC’Y OF ST., http://www.sos.ca.gov/archives/collections/
constitutions [https://perma.cc/3SN7-L3UN]; California Admission Day September 9, 1850, 
CAL. DEP’T OF PARKS & RECREATION, https://www.parks.ca.gov/?page_id=23856 
[https://perma.cc/3EEM-HWN2]. 
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both San Diego and San Jose on March 27, 1850, and Los Angeles on April 
4, 1850.33  Among the last few incorporated resort or tourist-driven charter 
cities in California are Big Bear Lake and Solvang, incorporated in 1980 and 
1985, respectively.34  They are atypical as charter cities for their size and 
population.  The last city incorporated in the state of California, on July 1, 
2011, was the city of Jurupa Valley in Riverside County.35  Wildomar is a 
general law city, joining the ranks of a substantial majority of cities in 
California. 
California general law cities can always seek to transform themselves into 
charter law cities, embracing more control through the adoption of a charter 
in municipal elections.  However, these instances are rare.  Recent ballot 
initiative attempts to transform general law cities to charter law cities have 
seen mixed results in California.  Some, like the city of Vista, have 
succeeded, while others, like Rancho Palos Verdes and Costa Mesa, have 
failed miserably in municipal elections for political reasons.36  In the latter 
examples, cities very publicly drafted charters to bypass the public 
contracting code to procure public contracts or limit public pension liabilities 
but were opposed by public service unions.  These unions’ political muscle 
in California was not to be underestimated.37 
Although political tensions over who should exercise power to govern 
local jurisdictions are not new, many local government officials in both 
charter and general law cities still subscribe to the view that they, rather than 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See California Cities by Incorporation Date, CAL. ASS’N OF LOCAL AGENCY 
FORMATION COMM'NS 1, 6 (Mar. 2011), http://calafco.org/resources/incorporated-cities/
california-cities-incorporation-date [https://perma.cc/73YA-5M72]; LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, 
supra note 30. 
 34. See ASS’N OF LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION COMM'NS, supra note 33, at 1; LEAGUE OF 
CAL. CITIES, supra note 30. 
 35. See ASS’N OF LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION COMM'NS, supra note 33, at 1; LEAGUE OF 
CAL. CITIES, supra note 30. 
 36. Melissa Pamer, Voters Dump Proposal to Make RPV a Charter City, PASADENA STAR-
NEWS (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.pasadenastarnews.com/general-news/20110309/updated-
voters-dump-proposal-to-make-rpv-a-charter-city [https://perma.cc/PN4W-SMGT]; Stephen 
Tedesco et al., California Supreme Court Rules That State’s Prevailing Wage Law Is Not 
Quite So Prevailing:  Charter Cities Need Not Require Prevailing Wages on Publicly Funded 
Municipal Construction Projects, LITTLER MENDELSON P.C. (July 12, 2012), 
https://www.littler.com/california-supreme-court-rules-state%E2%80%99s-prevailing-wage
-law-not-quite-so-prevailing-charter-cities [https://perma.cc/EU8R-UQS5]; Voters Reject 
Charter City Plan, STATE BLDG. & CONSTR. TRADE COUNCIL OF CAL. (Mar. 16, 2011), 
http://www.sbctc.org/doc.asp?id=182 [https://perma.cc/H6BY-5H2K]; Bradley Zint, City 
Charter Measure Soundly Rejected by Costa Mesa Voters, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/11/city-charter-soundly-rejected-by-costa-mesa
-voters.html [https://perma.cc/HMH6-C8HL]. 
 37. Kevin Dayton, How Unions Undermined the Rights of California’s Charter Cities, 
UNION WATCH (Mar. 28, 2016), http://unionwatch.org/union-backed-california-law-may-
scuttle-financing-of-sacramento-infill-project [https://perma.cc/M9FY-EZLG]. 
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the state, are best equipped to learn the needs of their constituents and 
respond to those needs in their own municipalities.  This view creates a 
certain degree of tension between members of various city councils in 
California and their state representatives, some of whom rise from the ranks 
of local governments.  For example, in 2011 the state of California abolished 
more than four hundred redevelopment agencies, using local redevelopment 
funds to help close a budget gap that the state itself had created by failing to 
exercise fiscal restraint in times of diminished revenues.38  The California 
Supreme Court sided with the state, inflicting a major blow to local 
redevelopment agencies authorized by law since 1945.39  Cities felt betrayed 
by their own representatives who voted to abolish this long established 
policy favoring redevelopment.40  The exercise of this state power at the 
expense of local power has damaged the relationship of local and state 
officials, who collectively continue to work toward reconciliation. 
II.  CALIFORNIA’S CHARTER LAW CITY AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 
SOVEREIGNTY IN MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS 
California’s charter law is an explicit grant of power to manage municipal 
affairs at the very local level.41  While general law cities enjoy a certain 
amount of home rule through the constitutional grant of police power, charter 
law cities enjoy more freedom because they are permitted to write their own 
charters to shape their styles of governance and, more importantly, cater to 
their local needs.  In addition, charters allow cities to declare supremacy over 
their municipal affairs. 
The issue of what constitutes a municipal affair in California remains very 
much in a state of flux, adding to the political tensions experienced by local 
and state officials. The original California Constitution does not appear to be 
too concerned with the appropriate management structure of a municipality 
and, thus, does not reference the term at all.  Recognizing the absence of any 
guidance on the topic by the Constitution, the California Supreme Court 
practically described what became Dillon’s Rule a few years after California 
adopted its Constitution.  The California Supreme Court held that “local 
governments derive their powers from the paramount political head, which 
while it cedes to certain local agents certain powers, does not thereby remit 
its rightful and ultimate dominion.”42 
The California Constitution of 1879 remedied a number of shortcomings 
of the first state constitution, including this lack of guidance.  Article XI 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Cal. Redevelopment Ass’n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 231, 253 (2011). 
 39. See id. at 245. 
 40. See id. at 262. 
 41. See generally CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7. 
 42. Pattison v. Bd. of Supervisors, 13 Cal. 175, 184 (1859). 
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clearly grants charter cities supreme authority over their municipal affairs so 
that their laws regarding municipal affairs trump state law:43 “[c]ities and 
towns hereafter organized under charters framed and adopted by authority of 
this Constitution are hereby empowered . . . to make and enforce all laws and 
regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to the restrictions and 
limitations provided in theirs several charters.”44 
In 1899 the California Supreme Court explained that charter provisions 
were “enacted upon the principle that the municipality itself knew better 
what it wanted and needed than the state at large, and to give that 
municipality the exclusive privilege and right to enact direct legislation 
which would carry out and satisfy its wants and needs.”45 
Instead of explicitly defining municipal affair, the California Constitution 
provides a set of core issues that fall under this category.46  For example, a 
city charter may establish the city’s election dates, rules, and criteria for 
elected office holders and procedures, including elections held at large or by 
district.47  A charter may allow public financing of elections and establish 
criteria for vacating and terminating municipal offices.48  A charter may 
establish council salaries and quorum requirements, except when particular 
laws require a supermajority vote.  A local charter may prescribe ethics and 
conflicts rules, including rules on incompatible offices.49  Charter cities also 
have broader taxation and assessment powers than general law cities, subject 
to the limitation of Proposition 218 (discussed later in this Article).50  Charter 
cities may draft zoning ordinances inconsistent with the local general plan 
                                                                                                                 
 43. See Johnson v. Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th 389, 399 (1992). 
 44. CAL. CONST. of 1879 art. XI, § 6. 
 45. Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 387 (1899). 
 46. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(b) (“It shall be competent in all city charters to provide, in 
addition to those provisions allowable by this Constitution, and by the laws of the State for: 
(1) the constitution, regulation, and government of the city police force (2) subgovernment in 
all or part of a city (3) conduct of city elections and (4) plenary authority is hereby granted, 
subject only to the restrictions of this article, to provide therein or by amendment thereto, the 
manner in which, the method by which, the times at which, and the terms for which the several 
municipal officers and employees whose compensation is paid by the city shall be elected or 
appointed, and for their removal, and for their compensation, and for the number of deputies, 
clerks and other employees that each shall have, and for the compensation, method of 
appointment, qualifications, tenure of office and removal of such deputies, clerks and other 
employees.”). See also Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th at 398 (concluding that state law on elections did 
not preclude the City of Los Angeles from adopting and enforcing provisions of its campaign 
reform ballot (Measure H) initiative under its charter). 
 47. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(b); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10101 et seq. (West 2016); 82 CAL. 
ATT’Y GEN. OP. NO.  98-1010 (Feb. 4, 1999). 
 48. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(b); Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th at 392 (1992). 
 49. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(b); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53234 (West 2007). See generally 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53235 (West 2007). 
 50. See generally CAL. CONST. art. XIIIC, § 2. 
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(unless, of course, consistency requirements are adopted by the charter or 
ordinance).51  In other words, the local charter is the supreme authority for 
municipal affairs relevant to that local jurisdiction. 
While the California Supreme Court has echoed the Government Code in 
some respects, holding that the topics above are municipal affairs, the legal 
construction of this term remains a challenge in California.52  The definition 
typically revolves around a distinction between municipal affairs and 
statewide concerns, such as transportation or utilities.53  Thus, when deciding 
whether a city ordinance is valid, courts consistently determine whether (1) 
the local regulation or ordinance is a municipal affair, upon which the 
municipality has the exclusive authority to regulate or (2) whether the subject 
is a matter of statewide concern such that state legislation preempts any 
municipal attempt at lawmaking.54  However, because the California 
Constitution does not specifically define municipal affairs, the California 
Supreme Court views the question to be decided on the facts of each case.55  
According to the Court, the concept of municipal affairs is fluid and may 
change over time.  Issues that are municipal affairs today could become areas 
of statewide concern in the future.  Therefore, it remains to be seen if the 
California Supreme Court will change course from a case-by-case review of 
municipal affairs and give direct meaning to the Municipal Affairs Clause of 
1896. 
A fairly recent and well-reasoned Pepperdine Law Review article 
encourages the California Supreme Court to bring clarity to the Municipal 
Affairs Clause and interpret the clause: 
[B]ased upon the people’s intent . . . Guided by the text, purpose, and 
political theory of the Municipal Affairs Clause, the court has the obligation 
to preserve California’s system of divided sovereignty and ensure that the 
people’s right to local self-government is preserved by the constitution they 
have framed for its preservation.56 
This legal indecision about the Municipal Affairs Clause also creates 
political tensions, most notably over cities’ treatment of public contracts and 
the payment of prevailing wages.  Some courts have exempted charter cities 
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 54. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d at 61-62; Brett A. Stroud, Preserving Home Rule: The Text, 
Purpose, and Political Theory of California’s Municipal Affairs Clause, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 587, 
604 (2014). 
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from complying with the Public Contracting Code provisions for bidding 
procedures, reasoning that a city charter may exempt the city from such 
statutes if the subject matter of the bid is deemed to be a municipal affair.57  
Perhaps even more importantly, courts have held that charter cities are not 
bound by prevailing wage or living wage laws unless they adapt them 
voluntarily in their charters or laws, as some cities like Los Angeles and San 
Jose have done.58  So long as a project is both a municipal affair and not 
funded by state or federal grants, a charter city may choose to not pay 
prevailing wages to complete a municipal project.59  However, there is a 
growing argument among state elected officials that the payment of 
prevailing wages is a matter of statewide concern, as are traffic and vehicle 
regulations, tort claims against governments, and school regulations.60 
In July of 2012 the California Supreme Court dealt a significant blow to 
this argument in its long-awaited decision of State Building and Construction 
Trades Council of California, AFL – CIO v. City of Vista.61  The Court held 
that locally funded public works projects performed by chartered cities are 
municipal affairs under the California Constitution.  As a result, the wages 
paid to workers on charter city projects are not subject to California’s 
prevailing wage laws.  In response, because it was not possible to overturn 
the Vista court’s ruling with a constitutional amendment, labor activists in 
California convinced the legislature to make it more difficult for charter law 
cities to obtain state funding for public works projects.  Senate Bill 7 (“SB 
7”) prohibits the receipt or use of state funding or financial assistance for 
construction projects by charter cities that allow contractors to not comply 
with the state’s prevailing wage laws on a public works contract.62  While 
there are minor exceptions for contracts under $25,000, the proposed law is 
a reminder of the labor sector’s palpable influence on California politics, 
despite a robust opposition by the League of California Cities on behalf of 
local jurisdictions.  In its letter opposing the legislation, the League wrote: 
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[SB 7] will retroactively punish the voters and residents of 51 charter cities 
[without prevailing wage provisions in their charters] for exercising their 
right to vote on how city funds are spent by denying them access to any 
state funding for public works . . . . By seeking to impose punitive 
measures for decisions made by the voters of charter cities . . . [t]he 
public’s faith in government will be shattered . . . .63 
The League, and a majority of citizens in California, view legislation 
similar to SB 7 as both an intrusion by the state into the affairs of 
municipalities and an affront to their local control.64  Many local mayors and 
council members argue that, while the state may decide to pay prevailing 
wage rates for its contracts, the state should not impose this same burden on 
local governments for local projects without providing funding for the 
difference between market wages and prevailing wages.  After all, the 
provision for any municipal infrastructure is not a constitutionally protected 
area and is the concern of the municipality and its taxpayers, who voted on 
the specific charter to exclude prevailing wages.  A clear definition of 
municipal affairs from the California Supreme Court, by interpreting the 
Municipal Affairs Clause of the California Constitution, would go a long 
way in calming the two sides.65 
III.  CALIFORNIA’S GENERAL LAW CITIES AND STATE LAW 
The California Government Code authorizes general law cities to use the 
general laws of the state to govern themselves.66  Given the voluntary 
adherence to these general laws by local governments and their constituents 
when deciding to incorporate as a municipality, the dominance of state power 
is less of a concern in this context but never ignored.  Every California city 
possesses the general power to “make and enforce within its limits all local, 
police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with 
general laws.”67  For example, state law authorizes every city to be governed 
by a city council of five members.  Voters may choose a different number of 
council members to serve the city, but five remains the norm throughout the 
state.68  State law also establishes the positions of a city clerk, a city treasurer, 
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a police chief, a fire chief, and any subordinate employees as necessary and 
required by law.69  City elections, methods of elections, rules and procedures, 
and qualifications of council members are all provided for by the state law.70   
In stark contrast to charters, public funds may not be accepted or expended 
by any candidate to run for public office.71  Relevant provisions of the 
California Government Code address public office vacancies, council 
member compensation, specific legislative authority, and quorum 
requirements.72  State laws permit city voters to impose term limits for 
council members.73  The charter city controversy regarding the payment of 
prevailing wages on public works contracts is not an issue for general law 
cities, as they must adhere to the requirements of the California Public 
Contracting Code for all public contracts and must pay prevailing wages for 
such contracts pursuant to the provisions of the California Labor Code.74  
Finally, all land use and zoning ordinances in general law cities must be 
consistent with the general plan for the city, as required by state statute.75  A 
general plan is typically prepared locally but is subject to the approval of the 
state, especially for housing.  This is one area, for example, in which a 
general law city cedes real control to the state. 
However, local government officials, on behalf of their constituents, 
always expect local control, even under general laws.  These officials are 
specifically elected to deliver a local quality of life to their constituents.  The 
expectations for local character is not one-size-fits-all in California, and, 
therefore, the demands on each local government differ from city to city.  For 
example, a local equestrian concern with bridal trail safety and access in 
Rolling Hills Estates, a semi-rural equestrian community, may not be a 
concern at all in Torrance, a more urban suburb of Los Angeles, and a local 
transportation concern in Torrance may not be a priority in Rolling Hills 
Estates.  For these very important constituency concerns and priorities, local 
control remains extremely important for city sovereignty in its own 
municipal governance structures.  Because California courts have been 
reluctant to infer legislative intent to preempt local laws, there is a strong 
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presumption that local ordinances are valid when there is a significant unique 
city interest that may be different from another city.76 
IV.  INDEPENDENT, FULL SERVICE, AND CONTRACT CITIES 
In addition to differing in the basis for their authority, California cities 
also differ in their style of governance.  While some cities are full-service or 
independent cities, others are known as contract cities.  As their name 
suggests, full-service or independent cities provide, themselves, a broad base 
of municipal services to their citizens.  On the other hand, contract cities 
deliver these municipal services through various contracts with other 
governments and private and not-for-profit contractors.77  However, both 
independent and contract cities are known to use strong mayor or council 
manager forms of internal governance to manage their communities. 
Although only a small minority of cities have strong mayors, most well-
known large cities in California, like Los Angeles, San Jose, San Francisco 
and San Diego, are strong mayor cities.  According to the Strong Mayor 
Council Institute, sixty-eight percent of the largest United States cities with 
over 600,000 people are strong mayor cities, and thirty-two percent use the 
council manager form of governance.  The percentages slightly change to 
almost sixty percent and forty percent, respectively, when including cities 
over 370,000 people.78  Most cities, whether independent or contract cities 
and whether charter or general law-based, use the council-manager system.  
According to the International City/County Management Association 
(“ICMA”) the council-manager form is the most common form of city 
government in the United States.79  The National League of Cities reports 
that usage for this form of government has grown substantially, especially in 
the Southeast and on the West Coast.80  The council-manager form 
encourages engagement and dilutes the power of any single political special 
interest group.  Each council member possesses equal power.  In the case of 
a strong mayor, there is a consolidation of at least political power into the 
mayor, who could, on behalf of a special interest group, attempt to dilute the 
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voices of the individual council members.  In the council-manager form of 
government, the chief executive in charge of the day-to-day activities of the 
city is the professional city manager.  This individual, like a chief executive 
in the private sector, is responsible for implementing her council’s policies.  
City managers are talented people with the education (typically a Masters of 
Public Administration) and skills to manage the daily activities of the city 
and, perhaps more importantly and unlike the private sector, to engage 
citizens for the purpose of proposing responsive local policies to the city 
council.81 
In practice, whether a city delivers services through a contract or provides 
those services in-house depends on the size of the city and the goals of its 
constituency.  For example, the city of Glendale, California, a full-service 
and charter city of 200,000 inhabitants, delivers all police, fire, 
transportation, public works, planning, and even some utility services with 
its more than 1800 full time employees.  The benefits of full-service delivery 
for local governments include local and internal control over the way in 
which services are delivered and provided.  This delivery method can also 
include greater flexibility in the distribution of staffing solutions during a 
specific need or emergency.  More importantly, cost-benefit analyses show 
that, for Glendale’s size, full service may be more efficient and cheaper than 
contracting for those services.82  The total cost of providing a service in-
house (the independent city or full-service city model) is the sum of its direct 
costs plus a proportional share of organizational overhead, or indirect costs.  
Pension, facility, and capital equipment costs are typically the largest direct 
costs of an independent city.  When direct and indirect costs in an 
independent city are less than the sum of potential contract costs plus 
contract administration costs, then the independent city model may make 
financial sense over the contracting model, as experts determined in 
Glendale.83 
On the other hand, La Cañada Flintridge is a general law contract city of 
approximately 20,000 inhabitants managed by twenty-five full-time 
employees.  La Cañada Flintridge contracts for most municipal services.  It 
obtains police, fire, public works, and animal control services from the 
county of Los Angeles, utilities from semi-private organizations like 
Southern California Edison, and trash-hauling services from the private 
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sector.84  Instead of being responsible for providing these services, the city 
manager and employees of La Cañada Flintridge supervise and manage 
them.  The advantages of this model of delivery include efficiency and price, 
reduction of pension liabilities by employing fewer full-time public 
employees, limited liability in the delivery of products and services, and 
access to a greater volume of resources and innovations. 
Whether a city chooses the independent or contract model, pension 
liabilities remain the biggest obstacle for local governments in this new era 
of Governmental Accounting Standards Board (“GASB”) rules.  These rules 
became binding on states and local governments for fiscal years starting after 
July 2014.  GASB rules require the full disclosure of pension liabilities and 
expenses to represent more transparently the full impact of these 
obligations.85  These future obligations typically remain unfunded in 
California, and, according to the state Controller’s office, California’s 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (“CAFR”) puts the net pension 
liability at $63.7 billion as of June 2015.86  Therefore, municipal policy 
bodies in California are more apprehensive than ever about pension liabilities 
and adding to those liabilities. 
V.  THE LAKEWOOD PLAN FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONTRACT CITY 87 
Although contract cities have historically collaborated horizontally with 
other municipal governments, today’s contracting model expands the scope 
of collaboration vertically, involving service providers outside of 
government in the private or not-for-profit sector. 
This collaboration delivers statutorily defined special municipal services 
in finance, economy, accounting, engineering, administration, and law, 
creating an efficient system for public administration.  In this context of the 
California contracting model according to the Government Code, two 
relevant statutes facilitate extra- and intra-sector collaboration.  California 
Government Code Section 37103 explicitly provides special services in 
stating that a city “may contract with any specially trained and experienced 
person, firm or corporation for special services and advice in financial, 
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economic, accounting, engineering, legal, or administrative matters.”88  
California Government Code Section 53060 allows the legislative body of 
any public or municipal corporation or district to “contract with and employ 
any persons for the furnishing to the corporation or district special services 
and advice in financial, economic, accounting, engineering, legal, or 
administrative matters if such persons are specially trained and experienced 
and competent to perform the special services required.”89 
Although, arguably, all cities engage in contracting, the designation as 
contract cities has a special and historical meaning in California.  The post-
World War II era ushered in a new style of public administration led by men 
and women, labeled the Greatest Generation by journalist Tom Brokaw.90  
The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 – commonly referred to as the 
GI Bill – is still one of the most significant pieces of United States federal 
government legislation of all time.91  The GI Bill impacted the nation 
socially, economically, and politically.  Helping veterans assimilate into civil 
society was a brilliant move by the federal government, a move that sparked 
community-building, education, innovation, and the development of giant 
industries.  Western regions, particularly Southern California, immensely 
benefit to this day from this federal policy, which, through educated WWII 
veterans, is responsible for the development and advancement of the defense 
and aerospace industries in Los Angeles County.  These two industries 
employ high-wage earners facilitating the economic development of many 
cities surrounding the Los Angeles Air Force Base.  Some communities, 
including the Palos Verdes Peninsula, have thrived since the early fifties 
because of the job opportunities with companies like Raytheon and Northrop 
Grumman, which are industry leaders in space, missile-development, and 
military technologies.92 
Using the benefits of the GI Bill, the Greatest Generation purchased 
homes in various communities throughout the nation and attended local 
colleges and universities where they excelled in disciplines like engineering, 
entrepreneurship, medicine, business, and law.  This level of education 
substantially improved the earning capacity of each participating service 
member, uplifting the middle class and establishing a sustainable upper 
middle class.93 
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This economic base was the recipe for city and community building in 
Southern California. After a long hiatus of city incorporation in Los Angeles 
County going back to 1939, the unincorporated area immediately adjacent to 
the established city of Long Beach, California, was one community ready to 
make history.  This area ten miles southeast of Los Angeles blazed new trails 
literally and figuratively when, based on demand, the Lakewood Park 
Company developed one of the first post-World War II era planned 
communities, which consisted of 17,500 homes on over 3500 acres of land, 
including landscapes, streets with lights, and underground sewers and wires.  
Reminiscent of the success of Levittown in Nassau County, New York, 
unincorporated Lakewood grew to 70,000 residents in the first few years of 
the 1950s, using slogans such as “Lakewood – My Home Town” and 
“Lakewood, Tomorrow’s City Today.”94 
In April of 1954, the Lakewood communities, under threat of annexation 
from the City of Long Beach, incorporated as the state’s 16th-largest city and 
the largest community in the United States ever to incorporate as a sovereign 
city.95  What was remarkable about this incorporation was not the necessity 
or the actual decision to become a city but, rather, the decision made by city 
founders on the financially sound and efficient method to administer the 
city.96  A poster child of the GI Bill, as a graduate of USC Law School, John 
Sanford Todd advised the city founders to use an existing statute of the 
California Government Code and a section of the county charter to 
collaborate with the county government and contract for the delivery of 
municipal services in young Lakewood.97 
Although the original motive behind Lakewood’s incorporation was to 
retain local control over local services, the purpose of what became known 
as the Lakewood Plan was to eliminate duplication of services and rely on 
government service providers to deliver public administration in a cost 
effective manner.98  This innovative and transformational plan not only 
earned the City of Lakewood prominence in the history of American 
municipalities, it also became the model for forty-one additional 
communities in Los Angeles County and more than 130 communities across 
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the state in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.99  Like Lakewood, these 
communities selected the model to retain a level of sovereignty or local 
control within their borders, through collaboration with the county, the 
private sector, and the not-for-profit sector. 
This engaged governance model of the Lakewood Plan, or contract cities, 
encourages the public and private sectors to jointly study experience and 
solve policy and public administration challenges.  This network of inter-
sectoral actors provides the best setting for professionals to work together 
for the public interest.  While the motivation of each sector may be different, 
the collective end result benefits the public.  The Plan emerged from a 
“perfect storm of conditions.”100  These conditions included the demographic 
changes in the county (especially in the number of residents and 
socioeconomic status), the necessity to grow communities like Lakewood, 
and the incentives to participate in collaborations by both the county and 
newly developed cities to share revenue and provide more efficient non-
duplicative services.  The social and human capital, as well as the facilitative 
leadership skills of people like John Sanford Todd, may not be 
underestimated for the success of the collaboration and the Lakewood 
Plan.101 
To preserve the innovation in the Lakewood Plan and the usefulness of 
the model for like-minded jurisdictions, eight cities gathered on November 
20, 1957 to form the California Contract Cities Association (“CCCA”).102  
The like-minded cities were: Lakewood, Bellflower, Duarte, La Puente, 
Norwalk, Paramount, Rolling Hills, and Santa Fe Springs.103  The first by-
laws of the CCCA were drafted in 1958.104  By the early 1960s, the CCCA 
had drawn twenty-five members across the county to help organize new 
cities preserving the contracting model.  Half a century later, CCCA, with 
just under seventy member cities, still nurtures this network of cities through 
educational seminars and information designed to build and improve human 
capacity among its constituency in order to help them better serve their 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Zerunyan & Pirnejad, supra note 77. See generally Frequent Questions, CAL. ASS’N 
OF LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION COMM’NS, http://www.calafco.org/index.php/lafco-law/what-
is-lafco/faq-calafco [https://perma.cc/9LE7-TWT7]. 
 100. Zerunyan & Pirnejad, supra note 77. See generally The Lakewood Plan, CITY OF 
LAKEWOOD, CAL., http://lakewoodcity.org/about/history/lakewoodplan/ [https://perma.cc/VT
6D-2FRH] (last updated Oct. 20, 2014). 
 101. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 51301 (West); L.A. CTY. CHARTER § 56 ½–¾.  
 102. History, CAL. CONTRACT CITIES ASS’N, http://www.contractcities.org/about/history/ 
[https://perma.cc/CN8V-F6VD]. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
236 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
communities.105  The network efficiently, and in large numbers, advocates 
for interests common to member cities.  Finally, the network provides access 
to service providers, building social capital along the way to create value for 
member cities. 
The Lakewood Plan was controversial, as it did not fit the mold of best 
practices of state centered bureaucracy in public administration, which had 
become popular in the early 1900s.106  Even today some argue that the 
contracting model prevents larger forms of government, such as county 
governments, from providing services to all.107  However, neither the 
practice nor the data supports this argument. 
In practice the County of Los Angeles still receives the lion’s share of 
local taxes and is reimbursed fully for all services it provides to cities.108  
Most, if not all, cities in Los Angeles County provide more direct and 
certainly better quality municipal services to their constituents than to 
unincorporated areas of the county.109  All public safety infrastructure built 
by the county in the early 1950s is used by cities that contract for public 
safety services.  Instead of duplicative police services, for example, the Los 
Angeles County Sheriff Department provides public safety services to forty-
two out of eighty-eight total incorporated cities in the county.110  The Sheriff 
department’s annual revenue from these contracting cities and other contract 
law enforcement programs surpasses $850 million.111 
Established contracting law in the state allows the County Sheriff 
Department to recover the costs associated with each jurisdiction it serves, 
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and most California Counties receive the largest tranche of a city’s revenue.  
Specifically, in the case of Rolling Hills Estates, property tax is apportioned 
24.3% to the County of Los Angeles, 41.1% to state and local education, 
including 20.1% to the local Palos Verdes School District, 18% to the Los 
Angeles County Fire District, 10.1% to various special districts like the 
library and community colleges, and 6.7% to the city of Rolling Hills 
Estates.112  Admittedly, some cities in California receive a better share in a 
larger range of the total property tax collected in their city.113  Sales tax, the 
second largest source of city revenues, is also apportioned to substantially 
benefit the state rather than cities.  While some cities receive up to thirteen 
percent of sales tax dollars in their city, most cities see less than this amount 
as their share of sales tax revenue.114  The City of Rolling Hills Estates 
receives less than seven percent.115  Last but not least, the County of Los 
Angeles is the largest recipient of contract city expenditures in fire, police, 
and public works.  These expenditures are typically the largest for any city 
using the contracting model.  Despite the conflict perceived by some that 
contract cities act at odds with counties, the county enjoys a very 
collaborative working relationship with each contract city through each 
supervisorial district.  Contract cities are, therefore, not a liability to the 
County of Los Angeles in terms of revenues and expenditures but solid 
partners in delivering accountable public administration throughout the 
county.  This partnership is further solidified by each supervisor in Los 
Angeles County who represents several contract cities in her supervisorial 
district.116 
The contracting model, set out in the Lakewood Plan, maximizes local 
control to create fully sovereign cities, sometimes with as little as a few 
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hundred residents.117  It increases efficiency and addresses local 
demographic problems, allowing cities to scale contracted services to their 
particular needs, rather than staffing a large municipal bureaucracy, and with 
the support of the California Contract Cities Association.  This network 
provides the framework for future collaborations in public administration 
and public policy.  Cultivating different motivations of actors in various 
sectors for the delivery of a common mission is the hallmark of this 
successful collaboration model.118 
VI.  CITY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE 
The contracting model and any municipal public administration 
contemplate the provision of municipal services under the responsibility and 
supervision of an elected city council, the policymaking body of the city.  
The city council retains and exercises all legislative and executive powers 
under California law.119  The city council sets the limits and parameters of 
services to be provided and approves the contracts to support those services.  
While the actual delivery of the service may be contracted to a more efficient 
and effective provider of the service, the policy and the responsibility that 
comes with it is never outsourced.120 
City councils are transparently accountable to their citizens for the 
delivery of all municipal services, contracted or not.121  To assist in these 
responsibilities, the city council appoints a city clerk, a city treasurer, and a 
city manager (though in some cities these functions are performed by elected 
officials as well).122  The supporting cast of department heads and staff, like 
a director of planning or director of parks and activities, to mention a few, 
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are hired by the city manager, who is directly and solely responsible for their 
performance.  Most contract cities are council-manager and general law 
cities, which deliver efficient and effective municipal services to their 
constituents.123 
By way of example, the City of Rolling Hills Estates, California is 
organized like any other typical general law and contract city.124  This city 
of semi-rural equestrian character with a little more than 8000 residents 
provides a wide range of municipal services, including administrative, 
building, public safety, public works, and other related and necessary 
services just like any other city, but it does so, in large part, through 
contracting with other government agencies, private firms, nonprofit 
organizations, and, most importantly, individual volunteers as citizens 
engaged for change.  In the tradition of the city since its incorporation in 
1957, all elected and appointed public officials who reside in the city serve 
the city on a volunteer basis.125 
The city manager in Rolling Hills Estates, the assistant city manager, and 
every department head, aside from their administrative duties as hired staff, 
manage a contract for the delivery of municipal services within their specific 
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area of expertise and practice.126  The city manager typically manages public 
safety contracts (police, fire, and paramedics) with the County of Los 
Angeles, and the city attorney contracts with a private sector lawyer.  The 
assistant city manager is in charge of all public-works-related contracts with 
the county, services like animal control, and private contracts for waste 
management, roads (building and maintenance), traffic, and safety.  The 
planning director reviews and manages contracts with county building and 
safety, as well as private sector planners, land use consultants, and engineers.  
The administrative services director, serving also as the treasurer, typically 
oversees information technologies, human resources, and accounting 
activities through various contracts with the private sector.  The community 
services director oversees contracts with the private sector relating to 
equestrian and other recreational concerns, including the municipal stables, 
parks, and trails.  Shareholder-owned utilities provide services for gas, 
electricity, and water.  Most administrative services remain in the city hall, 
including a small planning staff to process planning applications.  A few 
California special districts,127 created by the local Palos Verdes Peninsula 
community to meet special needs, participate in the overall delivery of 
services.  These services include a separate school district, a library district, 
and joint-powers authority to deliver transportation services in the city and 
the surrounding Palos Verdes Peninsula. 
VII.  UNIFORM LAWS GUIDING MUNICIPALITIES 
A certain amount of human capital is necessary to manage contract and 
full-service or independent cities.  To guide this management, fairly uniform 
laws and rules govern procedures, conduct, and decorum in city councils and 
in city halls across California.  These include the Ralph Brown Act (“Brown 
Act”), the Political Reform Act of 1974 (“Act”), and the Act’s implementing 
rules promulgated by the Fair Political Practices Commission (“FPPC”).128  
The FPPC has jurisdiction over all city governments, whether charter or 
general law.129  These significant pieces of legislation underscore the 
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emphasis in American law on transparency in municipal government and 
illustrate how progressive California is on the topic.  The preamble of the 
Brown Act describes public service at this level as well as the people’s 
expectations in the conduct of the people’s business: 
The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which 
serve them.  The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public 
servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what 
is not good for them to know.  The people insist on remaining informed so 
that they may retain control over the instruments they have created.130 
This preamble and the Brown Act itself shine a positive light on the 
municipal enterprise; nothing is a secret in deciding the people’s business.  
Local public officials in trouble with the law and the rules tend to forget this 
golden rule.  California has had painful experiences in the cities of Bell, 
South Gate, Maywood, and others.131  New and good leaders in those cities 
are learning how difficult it is to recover from the violation of the golden rule 
by their predecessors, who are for the most part serving time in prison. 
Highlighting the importance of transparency also assists public officials 
in avoiding conflicts of interest in the exercise of their responsibilities as 
public servants.  Conflicts of interest for municipal office holders under 
California law can arise in a variety of ways and are governed by a myriad 
of laws, including the common law conflict of interest doctrine developed 
through precedential court decisions and statutory conflict of interest 
rules.132  The common law doctrine provides that a public officer is impliedly 
bound to exercise the powers conferred on her with disinterested zeal and 
diligence and primarily for the benefit of the public.  Public officers are 
obligated by virtue of their office to discharge their responsibilities with 
integrity and fidelity and are prohibited from placing themselves in a position 
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where their private, personal interest may conflict with their official 
duties.133 
In addition to the common law doctrine, California has codified the 
prohibition against public officials’ self-dealing in contracts since the 1850s.  
This prohibition is commonly known as the Section 1090 prohibition and 
provides that public officials cannot be financially interested in any contract 
they made in their official capacity or by the body of which they are 
members.134  The ramifications of violating this law are quite serious.  A 
contract made in violation of Section 1090 subjects the officer to a fine or 
imprisonment and to a perpetual disqualification from holding office in 
California.  Moreover, the contract is unenforceable and may be void.135  In 
the context of the contracting model, the common law and this codified 
prohibition, and its intentionally harsh violation consequences, assure the 
fair administration of the model. 
More recently, the California Legislature enacted the Political Reform Act 
of 1974 to ensure that public officials in charter and general law cities 
perform their duties in an impartial manner.136  The Act provides that no 
public official can make, participate in making, or attempt to use her official 
position to influence a governmental decision if she knows or has reason to 
know that she has a financial interest in the decision.137  The purpose of the 
Act is to ensure that public servants who are entrusted with the privilege of 
conducting the public’s business do so in a manner that promotes an orderly 
system of public administration.  The FPPC implements and promulgates 
rules associated with the Act.138  These rules are the public’s minimum 
expectations from its public officials tasked with managing charter or 
contract cities.  The Commission is responsible for prosecuting violations of 
these rules. 
VIII.  TAX MATTERS AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
Tax and municipal financing matters have been infamous in California 
due to political battles over tax measures in the 1970s.  A complete 
understanding of the legal authority for these matters can be complex and is 
outside the purview of this article.  Generally speaking, however, the 
California Supreme Court has said “[t]he provisions on taxation in the state 
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Constitution are a limitation on the power of the Legislature rather than a 
grant to it.”139  These limitations exist in Article XIII A of the California 
Constitution, affectionately known as Proposition 13 of 1974, which 
continues to be subject to support and scrutiny from differing organizations 
in the state.140  A less known taxing initiative is Proposition 218, which was 
enacted in 1996 to ensure that all taxes and most charges on property owners 
are subject to voter approval.141  Both of these tax measures may result in 
reduced revenues to the state and municipalities, but they achieve an 
important purpose for the California electorate, placing the power to tax 
squarely within the discretion of the taxed at the local level.  Both charter 
law cities and general law cities enjoy these powers within the limitations of 
the California Constitution and Proposition 218, even though a charter city’s 
authority to levy taxes comes from the municipal affairs clause of the 
California Constitution, while a general law city’s authority is written in 
statute.142  The limiting constitutional provisions apply to each of 
California’s more than 7000 cities, counties, special districts, schools, 
community colleges, and regional organizations.143  These limitations in 
concept mirror the intent of the California Constitution to drive power away 
from the state, especially on local affairs. 
Because tax revenue is typically associated with improvements in a given 
city, several finance laws attempt to fill the revenue gap created by 
Propositions 13 and 218.  The Improvement Act of 1911, Municipal 
Improvement Act of 1913, Improvement Bond Act of 1915, Landscaping 
and Lighting Act of 1972, Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982, 
and several other related statutory schemes, such as infrastructure finance 
districts and enhanced infrastructure finance districts, allow cities in 
California to finance public infrastructure.144  S.B. 628 was signed into law 
in 2014 to address the abolition of the Redevelopment Law, which funded 
public infrastructures since 1945.145  The bill created enhanced infrastructure 
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finance districts (“EIFDs”), new governmental entities governed by a public 
financing authority made up of local elected officials.  The purpose of the 
EIFDs is to develop and implement an infrastructure-financing plan using 
tax increments to build and finance public facilities. 
In short, these special state financing acts and entities are flexible tools 
used by local government agencies to pay for improvements and services in 
public areas for both charter and general law cities.  Applicable public 
services may include streets, water projects, sewage and drainage, electricity 
infrastructures, parks, and police protection to newly developing areas.  As 
forms of benefit assessments, the acts are based on the concept of assessing 
only those properties that benefit from improvements financed, either 
directly or indirectly, through increased property values.  Charter and general 
law cities have used these localized tools in order to build much-needed 
infrastructure in their cities to relieve some of the tensions created by the 
repeal of the redevelopment law in California.146 
CONCLUSION 
Aristotle once argued that true democracy could only flourish in small 
political organizations.  His view was that humans flourish best within a city 
“since it alone provides the environment within which we can realize our 
natural potential for practical reason, by actively engaging in public 
affairs.”147  This concept serves to abolish physical constraints to 
accommodate an assembly of citizens in a direct democracy, hence 
Montesquieu’s claim that “it is natural for a republic to have only a small 
territory.”148 
Influenced by these and other political philosophers, the drafters of the 
U.S. Constitution created American federalism, which prescribes a balance 
of two complimentary strands of power, one horizontal, among equal 
branches of government, and the other vertical, among states, counties, and 
cities.  The purpose behind these strands of power was to protect the 
individual and the liberties she enjoyed under the Constitution.  Madison 
wrote:  
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal 
government, are few and defined.  Those which are to remain in the State 
governments are numerous and indefinite . . . . The powers reserved to the 
several States will extend to all the objects, which in the ordinary course of 
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affairs concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the 
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.149  
Madison was, and still is, right.  This vertical system of administration 
divides authority among manageable units or in small political organizations.  
It allows problems to be solved on the level where the problem originates—
in other words, it allows the government closest to the people to promptly 
and efficiently address the needs of the people it serves. 
Much has been written on the efficiency and responsiveness of local 
governance.  More than fifty percent of the world population already lives in 
cities, and that number is said to increase to seventy percent by 2030.150  
Cities are home to people who live and die in them.  Cities are the main 
incubator of the most important innovations in technology, culture, policy, 
and administration.151  With the exception of very large cities, where things 
are less manageable and more political, city mayors and council members 
are our neighbors and friends.  They see each other at the local little league, 
the youth soccer field, the grocery store, and the local bank.  They are 
responsive and accountable to citizens, face to face and on a regular basis.  
They are typically non-partisan.  As such, their decisions are more pragmatic 
and aimed at solving problems rather than towing a party line.  This reality 
recalls the famous words of Mayor LaGuardia of New York, reminding 
mayors and council members that “there is no Democratic or Republican 
way of fixing a sewer.”152  In practice, this should remain the mantra of every 
local government official focused on good and responsive governance.153 
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